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Letter From the CEO, 2025

02.19.2025
Dan

The world is entering a new era of global competition and security, and our company is evolving to meet it.


A NEW ERA


In recent years, the post-Cold War world order has cracked and broken. The Golden Arches theory of conflict prevention failed, leaving the U.S. and our allies exposed, with deep economic dependency on authoritarian rivals. We now face frequent, explicit threats – not just from rogue states and non-state actors, but from “near-peer” competitors. Despite motivated attempts at prevention, those threats have materialized into attacks, and free societies are falling under military domination.

Our leverage to deter such actions is not increasing. Competitors continue to execute historic military buildups, both qualitative and quantitative in nature. They brazenly execute grey-zone attacks against our own territories. They even invoke nuclear threats against us. These trends will define a new era. Without an urgent and effective response, there is little doubt that they will accelerate in the wrong direction.

Fortunately, as this reality set in, it has spurred a wave of urgent change. Over the past few years, forward-looking leaders both in government and industry have overcome inertia and starting to turn the ship. Defense strategy is modernizing. Procurement reform is accelerating. Technologists are proudly focusing on national security, and manufacturing is being re-shored.
Allied defense budgets are rising, and cooperation is increasing.

Basically, those who care about free people being well-defended against military domination are rallying in the right directions.

MISSILE DEFENSE

One area of technological competition that remains frustrated is missile defense. The history of
missile defense – technologically, strategically, and politically – is rich. It would be impossible to
comprehensively summarize that history in one letter. Suffice to say that longstanding beliefs
from each of those three perspectives have been upended by new realities.

Technologically, both the missile threats and possible defenses have advanced and diversified.
We’ve made progress, as the “hit-to-kill” approach to anti-ballistic missile engagement has been
demonstrated to work after decades of considerable doubt. At a macro level, new capabilities
like hypersonic flight, satellite megaconstellations, and directed energy are expanding the
potential concepts of engagement. At a micro level, key technology inputs have been disrupted
by step-change innovations in semiconductors, microchips, software-defined radios, vision
algorithms, propulsion systems, high temperature materials, and more.

Strategically, the theoretical calculus of missile defense and offensive deterrence has changed.
In the largely bi-lateral competitive environment of the Cold War, mutual abstention from anti-ballistic missile deployment had some theoretical merit. Between major powers, it helped ensure the logic of mutually assured destruction was undeniable. For smaller powers, it ensured that they could maintain their own credible deterrent against larger foes without massive arsenals of their own. In today’s multi-polar world with proliferation of missile and weapons technologies, these delicate balances are strained. Further, as long-range missiles end up in the hands of small and even non-state actors, the line between strategic and tactical missile defense blurs.
Politically, the calculus is changing for many players. Key arms control treaties have been violated and withdrawn from. Major powers have continued aggressive weapons build-ups. At the same time, allies have expressed doubts about the security of the U.S. umbrella and interest in pursuing their own offensive capabilities to meet this new reality. For all these reasons, the status quo no longer holds. We believe that it's imperative that the U.S. begin investing in missile defense technology in new ways.

OUR VISION

Today’s missile defense programs feature development cycles that are too long to outpace
threats (10+ years), that are not structured for innovation (cost-plus; $10-20B+ per platform),
and that produce unit costs that are too high to achieve effective deterrence ($10MM+ per
shot; $1B+ per battery).

There are good examples of how to streamline and accelerate this process to generate better
outcomes. From space launch to drones to electronic warfare, other parts of the aerospace
industry have achieved dramatically better results by taking a different approach to
development. Firm, fixed-price contracts awarded to multiple providers allow companies to put
private capital at risk and start innovating in different directions. Best execution wins, often
generating new capability with better performance at a fraction of the cost.

The good news is that enhancing current programs and experimenting to accelerate new ones
are not mutually exclusive. Existing systems are incredibly valuable and must be maintained
and expanded. At the same time, with a fraction of the total expenditure, the DoD can capitalize
on this modern style of development in missile defense to serve the mission in a new way.
With that in mind, we are setting out to help create the next generation of missile defense
systems. We envision systems that are:
VERTICALIZEDNext-generation systems need simple supply chains of basic materials and COTS
components. Test operations must be verticalized as well, so both ground and flight testing
can be frequent and iterative.
CONTAINERIZEDOperations costs, both during development and in the field, are a major contributor to total
system cost. Those operations benefit significantly from site diversity and mobility. Containerized form factors unlock new ranges, streamlined logistics, and more flexible operations.
MASS PRODUCIBLEAssembly and test are major drivers of both cost and production time. Next generation systems must be fast to build and certify.BREAKTHROUGHNew technologies in computation, electronics, propulsion, and materials offer the possibility of game-changing performance. Next-generation systems must be designed to rapidly incorporate these breakthroughs to outpace potential threats.

LONG WALL

As our mission sharpens to focus on missile defense, I’ve reflected on what it means for our
identity. I’m proud to share that our company is now Long Wall, inspired by the Long Walls of
Athens.
Many useful lessons in strategic competition come from the Peloponnesian wars. A simple, admittedly stylized telling is as follows.

On one side was Athens, the birthplace of democracy. Athenian culture was defined by a love of philosophy, arts, and architecture. On the other side Sparta, with its rigid social structure, strict discipline, loyalty to state, and fusion of military service into daily life.

After defeating a common enemy in the Persians, Athens and Sparta began competing for control of the new world order. Athens initially led through a technologically advanced navy, as well as cultural, political, and economic influence. Sparta countered with its large army by initiating proxy wars and subjugating neighbors.

Major conflict appeared increasingly likely, and Athens was vulnerable. Their core military advantage – a large naval fleet – depended on access to the sea, but their city was land-locked. Sparta had a clear advantage in ground warfare. Therefore, with a first-strike invasion, Sparta could besiege Athens, deny them access to their ports and any ability to respond.

Fortunately, there was a technology capable of solving this problem – walls. More specifically,
defensible walls long enough to create a safe corridor between Athens and its ports. Sparta was
so concerned about the efficacy of such walls that they tried to argue that Athens should unilaterally stand down from such a construction project, so as not to appear overly threatening to outsiders.

Luckily for Athenians, their leaders did not heed this argument, and by the 460s BC they were
constructing two Long Walls about 6km long each, 5m thick and 12m high, connecting the city to the ports. The walls formed a large, protected V-shaped wedge within which agricultural fields and other key infrastructure could be protected outside the main city walls. When war eventually did break out, the walls served their purpose, protecting the homeland and ensuring Athens could continue supporting their allies overseas.

ACCELERATE MISSILE DEFENSE

The parallels between this story and our current geopolitical dilemma are hopefully obvious. The
U.S. and our democratic allies have led the world order for the last few decades unchallenged, but that era is over. Our competitors are ramping up proxy wars, including by mounting direct missile attacks against civilians. Meanwhile, they are attempting technological breakout by growing and modernizing their missile threats.

Fortunately, there is technology capable of solving this problem. We will accelerate it.

- DAN PIEMONT